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Introduction
The journal that today goes by the name 'Public Choice' originally had a less appealing
but more accurate title: 'Journal of Non-Market Decision Making'. The impetus for the
new journal was apparently to make some headway on the thorny problem of decision
making by government actors by using the tools of modern economics. Although critics
of the public choice movement are quick to point out that government organizations are
different than firms because government entities lack the profit motive, that distinction
was precisely the reason for the new journaL The cornerstone of public choice, at least
as originally conceived, was a commitment to use tools of economic theory to analyze
actors and entities that systematically differ from traditional actors in private markets.
Although some in the field today prefer the moniker 'political economy' or 'positive
political theory' (PPT), the central goal remains the same: a rigorous and realistic under
standing of decision-making in government institutions.
This chapter sketches the public choice theory - or, more sensibly, public choice
theories - of the federal bureaucracy. How are administrative agencies designed and
what are the implications of these design principles for effective and efficient govern
ment? Administrative agencies have long been a staple of representative democracy,
analyzed by Weber, Tocqueville, Montesquieu and dozens of other prominent political
theorists.2 In most of these studies, the existence of administrative agencies is the starting
point for analysis. Yet, from the perspective of institutional design, there is no necessary
reason to assume that a supreme legislature will choose to delegate policymaking author
ity to a bureaucracy. Even if delegation to some bureaucratic entity results, legislatures
might sub-delegate to legislative bureaucracies rather than agencies located within the
executive branch.
Once an executive bureaucracy exists, however, the menu of available bureaucratic
structures will influence subsequent legislative decisions about whether to delegate
authority in a specific instance. Nevertheless, because other chapters in this volume
discuss the decision by the legislature to produce policy internally via casework or exter
nally via delegation, this chapter largely sets these questions aside. It would be perfectly
sensible to ask when and where legislators will delegate authority to agencies, condi
tional on agency structure and behavior. This chapter, however, asks how agencies are
and should be structured, conditional on an affirmative decision to delegate authority.
This is the problem of agency design.
A series of other useful surveys of positive political theory work on the bureaucracy
also exist (for example, Wintrobe 1997; Moe 1997). Inevitably, this chapter covers some
of the same ground and draws on these treatments throughout, but rather than simply
replicating existing surveys, this chapter emphasizes the insights of these literatures
through the lens of active debates in modern public law. Much of public choice abstracts
away from the actual legal environment. And while a growing body of public choice
333
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work has tackled concrete public law problems, particularly in administrative law, there
remains a significant gap between modern theoretical work in public choice and the
actual legal doctrines impacting agency design. Instead of attempting a comprehensive
survey of all public choice work on agency design, the chapter discusses some of the more
common and obvious areas of overlap, tacking back and forth between public choice
theory and agency design problems in public law. Rather than insist on a particular
application or interpretation, the chapter trics to illustrate the many ways in which these
traditions fit together.
Part I discusses relevant theoretical priors about the creation of a bureaucratic struc
ture, focusing on questions like what drives bureaucratic behavior, what is the political
problem that agencies are supposed to help solve, and what new problems does reliance
on agencies to develop public policy produce? Part II analyzes the conceptual relation
ship between the design of agency decision-making structures and the extent of control
by other political institutions like the legislature. Part II then applies these theoretical
insights to one administrative law doctrinal dispute (legislative rules) and one constitu
tional law doctrine (non-delegation). Part III turns to the problem of vertical bureau
cratic structure by focusing on the twin problems of bureaucratic centralization and
insulation, particularly in the context of the unitary executive debate. Part IV shifts from
vertical bureaucratic structure to horizontal problems by emphasizing public choice and
doctrinal disputes about the relationship among administrative agencies.
I. The problem of agency design
From the perspective of institutional design, the optimal bureaucratic structure depends
on the ends to be achieved. Unfortunately, as the other chapters in this volume usefully
establish, there is no shortage ofdisagreement about what precisely those ends are. When
designing agencies, legislators might seek to maximize political credit, minimize political
blame, guard against the bureaucracy implementing policy that diverges from legislative
views, reduce the risk that a future legislature will change policy, bring home the most
benefits for constituents, serve the gencral public interest, advantage citizen contributors
to campaigns, or protect their own tenure in office. Regardless of what ends legislators
prefer, bureaucrats might maximize budgets for their agencies, the scope of their own
power, leisure, the implementation of policy closest to their own preferences, stable
policy likely to be upheld by courts, or policy advantaging influential private interests.
Because these ends might be best facilitated by different design principles (means), at
least some discussion of theoretical priors is in order.
A. Agency preferences
The first generation of public choice work on agencies tended to be quite bureaucracy
centered. Niskanen's (1971) study of the bureaucracy argued that bureaucrats maximize
some mix of salary, perks, reputation, power, and flexibility. Wilson (1989) echoed these
sentiments almost two decades later. And if resources allow bureaucrats to pursue what
ever ends they prefer. then bureaucrats might simply and safely be assumed to maximize
budgets (Stearns and Zywicki 2009). Note that there is nothing nefarious about this
assumption. Bureaucratic zealots endlessly seeking to do the public's bidding will still
prefer to have the resources to pursue those ends. At the same time, those seeking to
maximize power or control will tend to seek more resources as welL This idea of agency
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empire building has received only mixed empirical support (Blais and Dion \991) and
agencies do not seem to seek systematic expansion of regulatory jurisdiction (Levinson
2005; Wilson 1989). A rational agency might prefer to maintain rigid control over exist
ing jurisdiction or avoid entering into regulatory domains that will prove especially
controversial or conflict with other agencies that are serving other interest groups or leg
islators. Moreover, although it is common to assume that once created agencies persist
forever, this simply is not true. Agencies are often tel'minated or restructured (Berry et
al. 2007; Lewis 2002); there is a risk to agency over-expansion or under-performance.
Alternatively, in many models of bureaucracy, bureaucrats seek to maximize not budgets
or power, but leisure. Agents, after all, often shirk (Brehm and Gates 1997, 1993; Miller
1992); perhaps agencies should be analyzed in the same way. Many of these assumptions
about agency preferences are defensible, but there is a general consensus in the literature
that we simply do not know what the typical bureaucratic objective function looks like
(for a useful introductory treatment, see Shepsle and Bonchek 1997).
Although the conceptual and empirical evidence regarding the 'what do agencies max
imize' question is mixed, the answer is directly relevant to ongoing disputes in the public
law of agency design. To take one example, how should courts evaluate agency judg
ments about the scope of agencies own jurisdiction? When an agency asserts the legal
authority to act in some new policy domain, should courts nod approvingly or look on
with skepticism? These questions are encountered most frequently in the ongoing debate
about whether Chevron deference should be given to agency determinations about the
scope of the agency's own jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding several opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court has not offered
a definitive answer about whether there is a 'scope of jurisdiction' exception to Chevron
(Merrill and Hickman 200 I; Sunstein 2006, 1990). Yet, the two main fixed points in
the case law map neatly onto public choice work about agency ends. One view assumes
that agencies are consistently interested in expanding their own authority, and therefore
courts should aggressively review agency assertions of new authority. This idea was
articulated some years ago by Justice Brennan: one reason deference is owed to agency
interpretations is that Congress has 'entrusted' the agency with administering the statute
(Mississippi Power & Light Co. v Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354,386 (1988) (Brennan, J., dis
senting)). If Chevron rests on an implicit delegation oflaw-interpreting authority, perhaps
it is awkward to infer that Congress intended agencies to define the scope of their own
authority. A second view, forcefully articulated by Justice Scalia, is that interpretive
questions about jurisdiction are no different from other interpretive questions. When
an agency interprets a statutory provision it is almost always enhancing or restricting its
ability to implement some policy; often it is impossible to distinguish jurisdictional ques
tions from non-jurisdictional ones. (Mississippi Power & Light Co., 487 U.S. at 381-82
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring».
Indeed, if there were no risk of political bias or self-interested agency behavior,
Congress might prefer to entrust agencies with the task of determining the scope of
their own jurisdiction. Even in the face of divergent preferences between agencies and
the bureaucracy, there is a tradeoff between utilizing agency expertise and agency self
dealing. Self-interested agencies' interpretations of their own authority could be
preferred by legislators, compared to de novo judicial pronouncements or the costs of
legislative specification ex ante.
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Against the inherited view of empire-building and never-ending agency efforts to
expand authority, public choice provides several reasons to question this assumption
(Levinson 2005). Indeed, the literature helps clarify that the 'no deference to jurisdic
tional judgments' view rests on unproven background assumptions about the behavior
of administrative agencies. Self-interested agencies sometimes overreach, but in the past
several years there have been many examples of what might be thought of as 'agency
under-reaching'. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) insisted that it did not
have jurisdiction to regulate greenhouses gases in Massachusetts v EPA, 549 U.S. 497
(2007). And before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) famously insisted it
had jurisdiction to regulate tobacco as a drug, it had for many years asserted precisely
the opposite: the relevant statute granted no authority to regulate (FDA v Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,161 (2000}).The apparent under-reaching might
be explained by agency efforts to maximize autonomy instead of regulatory authority, as
some models emphasize. The simple point is that public choice is filled with assumptions
and predictions that are not clearly consistent with the dominant account in administra
tive law of agency expansion (Niskanen 1971; Wilson 1989; Downs 1989). Moreover, if
agencies prefer more authority, then it is entirely rational for Congress to take account
of this desire when designing statutory schemes. Rather than assuming legislative naivete
and refusing to grant agencies deference on scope of jurisdiction questions, courts could
assume statutory schemes are chosen intentionally to take account of existing agency
tendencies. Currently, this is clearly a minority view in the law; public choice suggests it
should not necessarily be.
B. Legislative vieH'S
The modern bureaucracy is mainly a congressional creation. Although many Presidents
attempt to reorganize the executive branch so as to enhance political control or empha
size different policy domains (I-{owell and Lewis 2002), most administrative agencies are
creatures of statute. Although it is hard to abstract too far from the existing bureau
cratic structure. a fundamental lesson of public choice is that bureaucratic structure is
endogenous. One cannot simply ask, conditional on the existing bureaucratic structure
and agency performance, how should Congress delegate authority? The critical design
question is how Congress should structure the bureaucracy to achieve the optimal mix of
efficiency and effectiveness (H uber et al. 2001).
The second generation of public choice or PPT work on agencies turned from the
bureaucracy as a starting place to the bureaucracy as a consequence of congressional
choice. Rather than assuming Congress lacks effective tools controlling agencies, new
work emphasized the range of ways in which Congress could and does control the
bureaucracy (for example, Weingast and Moran 1983). Although Weingast and Moran's
account of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) policymaking has not gone unchal
lenged (Muris 1986), the work helped spawn a generation of scholarship known as the
Congressional Dominance school.
Once the terrain shifted from bureaucratic maximization to congressional controL
the modeling strategies shifted primarily to spatial models of policy implementation.
These models assume members of political institutions have preferences that can be
represented in spatial terms and that decision-makers prefer policy to be implemented
as close as possible to their ideal point. Because using agencies to make policy requires a
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delegation of decision-making authority from Congress to an agency. there is always a
risk that the ultimate policy will diverge from congressional preference. When designing
agencies, Congress and the President will therefore try to create an incentive scheme that
helps ensure that agencies implement policy that converges to legislative and executive
preferences.
As a result, principal agent models of various forms have come to dominate the field in
recent years. There are two standard problems with giving authority to an agent: adverse
selection and moral hazard (Huber and Shipan 2002). Picking the right type of agent and
ensuring the agent exerts effort, utilizes expertise, and implements policy according to
statutory requirements are the main challenge for agency design and administrative law.
Because agencies generally have better information or expertise than legislators, some
mechanism is necessary to ensure desirable agency behavior.
There are different ways to carve up this literature, but, as Huber and Shipan (2006)
argue, there are two main premises of the modern literature: preference divergence and
information asymmetry. That is, agencies (often) have different goals than politicians
or different judgments about how best to achieve these goals. Although legislators
presumably delegate authority to sympathetic agencies, both career civil servants and
political appointees are likely to have views that differ somewhat from the enacting
legislative coalition (Nixon 2004). Agencies also have systematically better information
than legislators. This informational advantage might refer to better knowledge about
the underlying state of the world (regulation needed or not needed), to the technology
for implementing policy (price controls versus cap and trade), or to the level of effort
required to implement policy.
These working assumptions are not always empirically accurate, but in the rare cases
in which they are not, then the core problem of agency administration does not really
exist. Agencies will simply do whatever legislators would want them to do. In the absence
of any shirking, preference divergence, or information asymmetry, the only problem for
agency design would be to manage the costs of producing regulatory policy. With these
two working assumptions in the background, much of the literature has matured around
four main themes: (l) policy uncertainty, (2) the ally principle, (3) substitution effects,
and (4) political uncertainty (Huber and Shipan 2006).
Policy uncertainty refers to the idea that there is uncertainty about the outcome that
will occur in the real world if a given policy is adopted. For example, will mandating
passive restraint systems in automobiles significantly reduce the number of deaths from
automobile accidents? One way of modeling this dynamic is to assume that after the
agent takes some policy action, the outcome is a function of the action combined with
another random variable. Requiring automobile manufacturers to install automatic
seatbelts may result in more seatbelt wear, but if seatbelts can be easily disconnected,
the relationship might be meager. If people feel safer when wearing seatbelts, they might
drive more aggressively. Sometimes when an agency takes a desirable action, it will nev
ertheless result in an undesirable outcome, which means that a sanctioning scheme that
rewards good outcomes and punishes bad outcomes will not perfectly discipline agency
decisions. A common way to think about this question is to assume that both players
in the game (the legislature and the agency) know something about the distribution of
the random variable, but that the bureaucrat has better information. This setup often
yields a result that as policy uncertainty increases for the politician relative to that of the
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bureaucrat, the politician will want to delegate more discretion to the agency (Huber and
Shipan 2006; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Bawn 1995; Calvert et al. 1989).
The ally principle, or policy conflict, refers to the level of preference divergence
between the principal and an agent. As the level of policy conflict between the principal
and agent increases, all else equal, the principal will want to grant less discretion to the
agent. When bureaucrats have preferences that converge with those of legislators, leg
islators can give greater discretion to agencies in order to take advantage of the greater
expertise (information asymmetry), without much risk that bureaucrats will deviate from
legislative views. Although agents may still shirk if effort is costly, agents will not want
to implement policies that systematically diverge from their own (and by assumption
Congress's) policy preferences. Along these lines, Wood and Bohte (2004) show that
agencies that are more structurally independent depend heavily on legislative turnover
and the extent of conflict between the executive and the legislature.
Agency discretion might be restricted ex ante in a number of ways including detailed
statutes, budgetary restrictions, procedural requirements, and so on (Epstein and
O'Halloran 1999). Alternatively, legislators might rely on ex post mechanisms - actions
taken after the agency selects a policy. The substitution effect relates to the trade-off
between restricting bureaucratic discretion ex ante (Spence 1999) and controlling agen
cies ex post. Given powerful and cheap ex post mechanisms of control, ex ante restrictions
will often be sub-optimal. The problem with ex ante restrictions on agency discretion is
that they restrict bureaucratic choice. Because agencies are assumed to have better infor
mation than legislatures, ex ante restrictions cannot take advantage of this expertise.
By the same token, when ex post controls are either ineffective or very costly, using ex
ante restrictions will generally be preferred by legislators (Bendor and Meirowitz 2004:
Huber and McCarty 2004; Huber and Shipan 2002). The substitution idea also has some
empirical support. For example, members of Congress who sit on agency oversight com
mittees are less likely to seek discretion-reducing mechanisms up front (Bawn 1997). And
in state government, the presence of ex post mechanisms like the legislative veto seems to
produce less detailed statutes (Huber and Shipan 2002).
Fourth, many early models emphasized preference divergence between politician
and bureaucrats, but somewhat artificially held political preferences (Moe 1989). Yet,
political preferences within Congress change over time. Politicians in one period face not
only a risk of bureaucratic drift a risk that implemented policy will differ from what
the enacting legislative coalition would prefer - but also a risk of legislative drift- the
risk that legislators in future periods with different preferences will undo the original
agreement and alter policy away from the originally preferred outcome (de Figueiredo
2002; Horn 1995; Shepsle 1992; Moe 1989). All else equal, as the risk of legislative drift
increases - that is, as the political uncertainty about the divergence between current
period political preferences and future period political preferences increases - politi
cians may prefer to insulate policy from future political control (Volden 2002a). Indeed,
Volden (2002b) finds that as state legislators face greater political uncertainty, the use of
insulated boards as a design tool increases as well.
II.

Agency structure and decisionmaking procedures

This part discusses the specification of agency procedures and decision-making structures
as a way of controlling agency behavior. Section A provides a critical discussion of the
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dominant structure and process theory. Section B applies these insights in the context of
the Legislative Rule doctrine of administrative law. Section C analyzes the constitutional
non-delegation doctrine through the lens of structure and process insights.
StrucLUre and process theory
In the late 19705 and early 1980s, the 'delegation as abdication' thesis dominated aca
demic debates about the bureaucracy. Critics of the New Deal argued that a headless
fourth branch of government had come to run American politics (Lowi 1979). The
bureaucracy not the President, Congress, or the courts - was said to drive important
public policy. Congress's willingness to give authority to administrative agencies was
criticized as an abdication of constitutional authority.
The last generation of administrative law scholars, however, was reared on the struc
ture and process thesis articulated by McCubbins et al. (1987, 1989) and refined by sub
sequent scholars (for example, Macey 1992; Bawn 1995; Epstein and O'Halloran 1994;
Balla 1998: Ferejohn 1987). Although the structure and process thesis now has many
variants, its simplest form asserts that legislatures can control agency discretion (policy
outcomes) by carefully delineating the process by which agency policy is formulated.
Together with procedural restrictions, manipulating the structure of agencies serves
similar ends. For example, creating a single agency to regulate a single industry might
ensure that the views of that industry are especially well represented in agency policy
(Macey I 992). The initial jurisdictional design determines which interest groups have
access to the agency and thus the extent to which those interests will be able to partici
pate and influence agency decisions. Variants on this idea have flourished. Restrictions
on the appointment and removal of personnel (O'Connell 2009; Eisner and Meier 1990);
ex ante review of proposed decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
(Kagan 200 I); legislative vetoes, and alterations in funding (Wood 1988, 1990); and
jurisdiction (Gersen 2007; Macey 1992) are all potential mechanisms for controlling
agency behavior.
Most of these structure and process tools can be understood as responses to the alleged
failure of ex post monitoring of agencies by Congress. As noted, a central premise of the
administrative state is that agencies have better information and greater expertise than
Congress; therefore, Congress ought to delegate to agencies (Aghion and Tirole 1997).
Because narrow delegations with extensive substantive restrictions would eliminate
agency discretion and expertise in policymaking, it is rare that Congress specifies the
actual content or substance of agency decisions. Absent the ability to specify content
directly, a natural inclination is to monitor agency decisions after the fact. Yet, if
Congress lacks the expertise to formulate policy in some domain, it is not altogether
unsurprising that Congress would lack the expertise to discipline the agency for failing to
act well in that domain. Agency failure might be the result of good-intentioned mistakes
(which Congress would prefer not to punish), or shirking (which Congress would prefer
to punish) or the intentional implementation of policy different than the enacting legis
lature coalition (which Congress would prefer to punish so long as the enacting coalition
continues to exist). Ex post monitoring is important, but can only accomplish so much
(Aberbaeh 1990; Dodd and Schott 1979; Ogul 1976).
Given the challenges ofex post monitoring, the structure and process thesis emphasized
ex ante restrictions that both mitigate the informational advantage enjoyed by agencies
A.
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and stack the deck in favor of certain interests to ensure the durability of the original
bargain. Structure and process scholars have emphasized the importance of procedural
requirements in organic statutes and the APA (McCubbins et aL 1987). Other alterna
tives exist as well, including administrative common law (Duffy 1998; Murphy 2006) and
the Constitution (Sunstein 1990). To illustrate, the notice-and-comment procedure for
generating new rules tends to be long, which allows observers in the legislature and the
public to observe agency actions. Regulated parties have the incentive to monitor agency
decisions and the legal ability to do so because of the APA. Because agency decisions
depend, in part, on information generated by the record, ensuring that interest groups
help generate the record constrains ultimate agency decisions (McCubbins et aL 1989).
Similar effects might be produced by regulating the timing of agency decisions (Gersen
and O'Connell 2008; Gersen and Posner 2007; Macey 1992).
So understood, the original McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast work on deck-stacking
is thematically quite close to ex post monitoring, but in a somewhat puzzling way.
Procedural restrictions affect policy by regulating the access of interest groups to the
decision-making process. Procedures stack the deck by ensuring certain parties get a lot
(or a little) access to the agency. Congress might simply carefully monitor and oversee
agency decisions using regular review like police patrols or rely on interest groups to
sound flre alarms when agencies go astray (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). McCubbins
and Schwartz argue that it will often be easier for Congress to ensure interest group
access to agency procedures and then rely on those same groups to alert Congress,
instead of carefully monitoring the beat on a day-to-day basis because ongoing oversight
is costly.
Note that the access of interest groups to the agency is related to the ability of those
interest groups to alert the legislature when the agency implements bad policy. On the
one hand, routine access ensures that affected interests will know about agency decisions
and therefore be able to sound alarms. On the other hand, a premise of the structure and
process thesis is that this access will produce policy that reflects the preferences of those
interest groups. If the agency proposes policy that converges with the views of affected
interests, no fire alarms will be sounded. Such a strategy therefore assumes that private
interest preferences converge with legislative preferences. Given preference divergence
among legislators, agencies, and interest groups, agencies may collude with interests to
implement policy that deviates from legislative preference.
Hill and Brazier (1991) and Arnold (1987) also argue that the thesis fails to identify the
conditions under which it would work. They argue that ex ante controls operate effec
tively when the enacting legislative coalition gives clear guidance that favor particular
choices, the coalition designs the structure and process requirements with the speciflc
intention of durability, and courts reliably enforce these requirements. Macey (1992)
argues that the original work was insufficiently attentive to the distinction between
process and structural efforts like limiting the jurisdiction of agencies to one or several
industries.
The structure and process tradition has always been accompanied by anecdotal
evidence about this agency or that regulatory program, but in the past several years
there has been more of a sustained effort to test the structure and process theories
systematically (Balla 1998; Eisner and Meier 1990; Wood and Waterman 1993,1991).
Agencies appear to shift output in response to personnel changes (Wood 1990; Wood
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and Waterman 1991) and organizational culture (Brehm and Gates 1996). As to the
influence of procedural restrictions specifically, Balla (1998) studied the effect of notice
and-comment process on decision-making at the Health Care Financing Administration.
The agency was more responsive to physicians expecting reductions in fees than to the
intended beneficiaries of a proposed new payment system, which the paper interprets as
evidence against the deck-stacking hypothesis.
The structure and process thesis is sometimes taken to mean that Congress, by specify
ing procedural requirements for agencies is actually limiting discretion and controlling
policy choices in a substantive way. But it is one thing to say that structure and process
matter for policy outcomes and quite another to say that they matter in a predictable
way that ensures control by Congress or interest groups. Notice-and-comment require
ments may open the agency decision-making process to the public or regulated interests
thereby ensuring agency discussion and perhaps even transparency. However, it is hard
to imagine that elaborately detailed procedures dictate anything like clear content, with
the possible exception of clear deregulatory mandates. And when the agency mandate
is clear, the ageney lacks the very sort of discretion that is generally said to underlie the
principal-agent problem.
Indeed, procedural restrictions on agencies have many alternative and less nefari
ous theoretical foundations. Mashaw (1990) argues that proeedures facilitate fairness.
efficiency, transparency. accountability, and legitimacy. Thus. the structure and process
deck-stacking thesis should be understood as one of several possible rationalizations of
the procedural restrictions imposed on ageneies. To be sure, procedures matter, but it is
not clear that procedures perform in the way that McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast origi
nally posited (West 1995; Spence 1997).
Virtually all of the above models assume information asymmetry; that is, they assume
that agencies have better information than politicians and analyze how rational politi
cians will structure the agency relationship as a result. More recent work has tried to
model the information dynamic itself. Rather than assuming that agencies have better
information, recent work has let the agency decide how much to invest in the devel
opment of expertise. Stephenson (2007) analyses how legislators might use decision
costs to encourage agencies to invest in information acquisition. Because agencies are
most likely to invest in information acquisition when the new information will matter,
agencies will ordinarily invest when they are indifferent between two courses of action.
Congress therefore might encourage expertise by manipulating the decision cost struc
ture right near the indifference point. These ideas build on Bendor and Meirowitz (2004)
who show that with endogenous bureaucratic expertise, politicians are more likely to
delegate to a non-ally bureaucrat (given certain levels of policy uncertainty) because
bureaucrats with divergent preferences are more likely to pay the costs of expertise.
A nice counterpoint is Gailmard (2002), whose model allows legislators to invest in
expertise too. Bureaucrats have incentives to invest in expertise as preference conflicts
increase, but as a result, expertise is more valuable to legislators in precisely those
same settings; therefore politicians may invest in information acquisition. producing
less bureaucratic discretion because the information asymmetry is reduced. (See also
Callander 2008.)
The structure and process ideas evolved predominantly in the context of the APA's
procedural requirements. Yet, some recent work has also emphasized alternative
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mechanisms that play on similar themes. Gersen and O'Connell (2008) analyze how the
legislature might utilize deadlines or other timing rules to facilitate control over agencies.
Many statutes contain deadlines that do not restrict how agencies must act or impose
substantive guidelines, but nevertheless restrict agency behavior. Unreasonable dead
lines may make it more likely that agencies reach bad decisions that will subsequently be
overturned by courts or legislatures (Carpenter et al. 2008). In the credit-claiming game,
deadlines might ensure bad agency outcomes that legislators or courts can subsequently
fix. Alternatively, deadlines can prompt otherwise recalcitrant agencies to prompt action.
If agencies, like many agents, have a preference for shirking, and if delay is an easier way
to shirk than producing low-quality regulations, the administrative process will have too
much delay. Timing rules are a potential remedy.
B. Legislative rules
Turning to related controversies in public law, the Legislative Rule doctrine of adminis
trative law illustrates some of the vulnerabilities in the structure and process orthodoxy.
Recall that the legislature controls agencies in the structure and process framework
by imposing procedural requirements that stack the deck in favor of certain interests.
Deck-stacking generates information production and delay, both of which facilitate
monitoring. In some circumstances, this is an accurate description of statutory require
ments imposed on agencies, but not everything an agency does is subject to extensive
procedural requirements like notice-and-comment rulemaking. And agencies are gener
ally given discretion about how best to articulate policy (Magill 2004; Hamilton and
Schroeder 1994). Agencies usually have discretion about whether to be bound by struc
ture and process constraints.
Sometimes, however, agencies must use formal procedures like notice-and-comment
rulemaking. One such setting is when an agency is issuing a legislative rule. If courts view
a new policy as imposing substantive legal obligations, the rule is deemed legislative,
which in turn implies that the agency must use (or must have used) notice-and-comment
rulemaking (or formal rulemaking) to implement the policy. 'The central inquiry in all
nonlegislative rule cases is this: Is the agency document, properly conceived, a legisla
tive rule that is invalid because it did not undergo notice-and-comment procedures, or
a proper interpretive rule or general statement of policy exempt from such proceduresT
(Manning 2004, 917).
Unfortunately, '[dJistinguishing between a "legislative" rule, to which the notice-and
comment provisions of the Act apply, and an interpretive rule, to which these provisions
do not apply, is often very difficult and often very important to regulated firms, the
public, and the agency'. (Hoctor v U.S. Department afAgriculture, 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th
Cir. 1996». As one scholar put it, '[tJhe subject of nonlegislative rules breeds bewilder
ment and frustration' (Anthony 1994,6).
Some portion of the confusion stems from inconsistent usage and definitions of the
relevant terms. Legislative rules are variously contrasted with interpretive rules, policy
statements, nonlegislative rules, spurious rules, and procedurally deficient legislative
rules. Legislative rules are generally (but not always) treated as equivalent to the term
substantive rules, which itself is contrasted not only with the above terms, but also with
procedural rules. The APA the source of notice-and-comment requirements unless
otherwise specified in an agency's organic statute- nowhere speaks of legislative rules.
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Rather, when describing the requirements of informal rulemaking in section 553, the
APA exempts from those requirements 'interpretative rules, general statements of policy,
or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice'. The APA contrasts 'substantive
rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law' with 'statements of general
policy or interpretations of general applicability fonnulated and adopted by the agency'.
Read together with § 553's exemption of interpretative rules and statements of policy
from notice-and comment-requirements, the APA could be said to require notice-and
comment rulemaking for substantive rules and not otherwise. But the terms legislative
rules and substantive rules tend to be used interchangeably.
If all legislative rules were deemed legally binding and all nonlegislative rules were
not, then an agency would face a simple choice: use more formal procedures that will
be given legal effect or use less fonnal procedures that may inform the public and low
level administrators of tentative interpretations, but that must be subsequently defended
in enforcement actions. In practice, this view has not quite become the law, nor has it
been universally embraced in the commentary. Indeed, courts and commentators have
struggled to make sense of the legislative rule doctrine. Although different courts take
different approaches, consider two ways that courts might distinguish legislative rules
(requiring notice-and-comment rulemaking) from non-legislative rules (not requiring
notice-and-comment). One is substantive, asking whether the agency intended to make
the policy legally binding or whether the new policy would produce a legally binding
effect independent of the agency's intentions. If so, the rule is legislative and is valid only
if notice-and-comment proceedings were utilized. A second is procedural, asking simply
whether notice-and-comment proceedings were utilized to issue the policy. Ifso, the rule
is legislative and binding; if not, it is not.
For current purposes, the resolution of the doctrinal dispute is much less important
than what the dispute signals for the structure and process thesis. First, agencies usually
get to choose which procedures to utilize to issue policy (Magill 2004). Agencies them
selves decide whether or not to use the relatively formal decision-making processes that
constitute the very mechanisms that the structure and process thesis claims control agen
cies. This is a bit like an employer specifying an elaborate code of conduct to control
workers and then giving workers the option of adhering to the code or not on any given
day. Second, in instances where an agency does not get to choose, there is widespread
confusion about how to define that set. Courts consistently struggle to make sense out of
the legislative rule doctrine. Third, the legislative rule doctrine is a judicially created and
judicially enforced restraint on agencies' decisions about which procedures to utilize. It
is only after agencies have made an initial decision about how to proceed that courts ever
ask whether the agency's decision was permissible. To the extent that courts are faithful
agents of legislatures, pushing agencies towards the constraining structure and process,
the system might work fine. If courts are imperfect agents of the legislature, however,
there are good reasons to be skeptical. At a minimum, the legislative rule doctrine
emphasizes that structure and process themes have teeth, only to the extent that courts
effectively enforce them. Unfortunately, many of the same principal-agent problems that
dominate the relationship between the legislature and agencies also dominate the rela
tionship between agencies and courts.
Indeed, if procedures constrain agencies only to the extent that courts enforce those
requirements, the judicial choice about whether to use a procedural test or a substantive
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test to implement the legislative rule doctrine may matter a great deal. The procedural
analysis requires that agencies utilize procedural formality if agencies want to impose
binding legal obligations. And this procedural formality would help legislators exercise
control over these legislative rules. The substantive legally binding effects test, on the
other hand, requires judges to make an ex post judgment about whether a given agency
policy statement is likely to produce a binding effect on regulated parties, an analysis that
might undermine the structure and process dynamics.
If there is judicial error in this inquiry, then the structure and process mechanisms will
constrain agencies less than their advocates might suppose. Agencies will sometimes opt
out of formal procedural requirements and nevertheless produce significant private party
behavioral changes. The deck will not be stacked in the way the structure and process
theory emphasizes and therefore agency policy will not be effectively monitored or
restricted. Additionally, the effectiveness of structure and process mechanisms depends
partially on judicial formulation of an opaque doctrine that few understand and on the
particular way in which that doctrine is implemented. The past 50 years have brought
little clarity to the underlying doctrine and the courts have used different doctrinal
markers to identify legislative rules.
Descriptively then, the effectiveness of the process mechanisms sketched by the struc
ture and process thesis will depend on the degree of agency discretion regarding these
procedures, which itself will depend on judicial enforcement that is likely to be uneven
because of persistent doctrinal uncertainty. One might view all this as a reason to ques
tion the viability of the structure and process thesis. Alternatively, if one wanted to facili
tate the use of structure and process tools to control agencies, one might simply favor
the procedural implementation of the legislative rule doctrine. If procedures are the main
mechanism for controlling agencies, there should be some clarity about precisely when
and how often agencies will actually be required to comply.
C. Non-delegation
The non-delegation doctrine is a constitutional law doctrine reqUirIng that when
Congress delegates lawmaking authority to an agency, it must be accompanied by an
'intelligible principle' to guide the agency's discretion. If not, advocates assert, Congress
has delegated 'legislative power' and the Constitution vests 'all legislative power' in the
legislative branch. Although the doctrine's constitutional pedigree is contested (Posner
and Vermeule 2002), and the doctrine used extremely rarely to strike down statutes, the
doctrine continues to occupy a central place in most standard treatments of administra
tive law. This section sketches a reading of the non-delegation doctrine against the back
drop of the structure and process thesis.
The non-delegation doctrine has been criticized on two fronts in recent years. One set
of scholars bemoans the judiciary's general failure to enforce the constitutional require
ment and trumpets the doctrine's importance for ensuring effective government. Because
the legislature is the most accountable branch, the non-delegation doctrine is said to
ensure accountable policy judgments. When Congress makes the hard policy choice and
provides an intelligible principle to guide the exercise of agency discretion, administra
tive agencies are said to exercise executive authority. They have discretion to choose
among policy alternatives, but their discretion is bounded by the principle laid down by
Congress in advance. The doctrine, therefore, should ensure that the legislature makes
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hard choices and that agency decision-making discretion is not unbounded. The judici
ary's failure to enforce the doctrine is lamentable on this view.
The other main line of attack questions the constitutional and pragmatic pedigree of
the doctrine itself. The non-delegation principle was not actively discussed by the found
ers, nor did it appear in Supreme Court cases until the late 1800s (Posner and Vermeule
2002). Public choice work on delegation presents a host of factors that should enter into
a normative evaluation of delegated authority. Some models of delegation illustrate
the dark underbelly of delegation; others the warm and sunny potential. Delegation
can create iron triangles of policymakers insulated from public control, but it can also
produce policy based on technocratic expertise and a deliberative process to which
affected parties have easy access. This chapter does not aspire to resolve this dispute
other than to urge that the best public choice scholarship shows that global claims about
the normative status of delegation are nonsensicaL Evaluation must be localized and sen
sitive to the institutional variation discussed above. Nevertheless, some of this literature
might be used to craft a weak defense of the norm's under-enforcement.
Although under-enforcement of constitutional norms is sometimes attacked as judi
cial abdication of constitutional responsibility, in the non-delegation context it might be
justified by an assumption that Congress generally has the right incentives to formulate
restrictions on agency behavior. When Congress provides few substantive limits on
agency discretion, that will generally be the right way to produce the mix of expertise,
responsiveness, insulation, congressional control and so on. Otherwise, the legislature
would specify a more serious substantive limit.
More importantly, substantive restrictions on agency discretion and procedural
restrictions are partial substitutes for one another (compare Stephenson 2006). To
control an agency, one might specify elaborate decision-making procedures with dead
lines, publicity requirements, and voting rules. Alternatively, one might specify a rigid
substantive standard against which any policy choice can be evaluated ex post. The
substitution effect suggests that as the legislature increases the stringency of one type of
restriction, the need to use the other is lessened.
To illustrate, when Congress gives authority to an agency to regulate 'in the public
interest', there is not much in the way of a substantive restriction, but the extensive
requirements of the organic statute or the APA, regarding how agency decisions must
be made and justified, will apply (subject to the above caveats). If structure and process
are weakly constraining, the additional requirement of an 'intelligible principle' or sub
stantive restriction on an agency's discretion may be unnecessary. In a world without
either the APA or procedural restrictions in organic statutes, the non-delegation doctrine
might be both important and actively enforced, but in a world with extensive procedural
requirements, perhaps the court's under-enforcement of the norm is sensible, on the
public choice view.
For most of the doctrine's history, the courts were strangely blind to this insight.
Instead, the courts tended to insist that seemingly vacuous substantive guides in statutes
provide sufficient restrictions to constitute intelligible principles. The Supreme Court's
most recent pronouncement on the matter suggests things may be changing. In Whitman
v American Trucking Association, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), the Supreme Court considered
a non-delegation challenge to a provision of the Clean Air Act. The Court upheld the
challenged provision, holding that the act provided a sufficient 'intelligible principle' to
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guide the EPA's exercise of discretion. However, in its exposition of the non-delegation
doctrine, the Court wrote:
It is true enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the
scope of the power congressionally conferred. While Congress need not provide any direction
to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to define 'country elevators: which are to be
exempt from new-stationary-source regulations governing grain elevators, it must provide sub·
stantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national economy. (ibid at 475
(internal citations omitted».

The doctrinal innovation is an explicit statement that the degree of restraint (control)
required by the Constitution varies with the scope of authority exercised by the agency.
One common justification for the non-delegation principle is that it controls the
exercise of discretion by administrative agencies. This idea is precisely the tradeoff
emphasized in public choice scholarship. Agency control can be accomplished either
with substantive standards or with procedural restrictions, but the greater the use of
one the lesser the use of the other. Such restraints trade off against one another as ways
of controlling agencies. Structure and process, if real constraints on agencies, ought to
be taken as partial substitutes for substantive restrictions. And therefore, even in the
absence of substantive limitations on agency discretion like intelligible principles, there
is some reason to think that agency decisions are meaningfully constrained by other
procedural restrictions. This, in turn, suggests the court's under-enforcement of the non·
delegation principle is a perfectly sensible approach to regulating agency design, not a
constitutional abdication.
III. Insulation and centralization
This Part emphasizes the problem of vertical control and insulation in the bureaucracy.
These issues have captured the imagination of public choice scholars for many years (for
example, Lewis 2002; Moe 1982; Wood and Waterman 1994) and relate to the unitary
executive debate that has dominated constitutional law circles recently (see Calabresi
and Yoo 2008). Can and should Congress insulate agencies from presidential control?
May Congress delegate authority directly to agency heads or other officials in such
a way as to differentiate direct presidential choice of policy? Strong unitarians argue
that the Constitution does not or ought not to tolerate insulated independent agencies.
Doctrinally, the Supreme Court has approved various degrees of political insulation, and
the number of agencies created with characteristics that limit presidential control have
increased substantially over time (Lewis 2004).

A. Public choice, insulation, and independence
In the last half of the twentieth century, Congress created 182 new agencies (Lewis 2003).
Forty-six percent were located within the existing cabinet, 13 percent were independent
agencies; and 19 percent independent eommissions (Lewis 2002). Forty-four percent of
these agencies were created with board structures like the EEOC (Lewis 2003, 47). Thirty
one percent of newly-created agencies are staffed by political appointees with fixed terms,
including the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Election Commission (ibid).
And 41 percent of new agencies have qualifications that limit who may head agencies;
approximately one-third of these require some partisan balancing (Lewis 2003, 48).
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Institutionally, less insulation is associated with strong majorities during unified govern
ment and more insulation is associated with strong majorities in Congress in divided
government (Lewis 2003, 60).
There is an unfortunate ambiguity in the usage of terms like insulation and independ
ence. Independence is a legal term of art in public law, referring to agencies headed by
officials that the President may not remove without cause. Such agencies are, by defini
tion, independent agencies; all other agencies are not. In the economics and political
science literature. however, the idea of independence has a more functional meaning,
referring to the degree of actual or effective control exerted over the agency by other
political institutions or the agency's location inside or outside the cabinet hierarchy.4
Unlike the dichotomous legal idea of agency independence, the functional public choice
notion is more or less continuous and is marked by a range of institutional features.
More functional independence is thought to result when an agency is created outside the
existing bureaucratic structure rather than within an existing cabinet department, as was
the norm in the early years of the bureaucracy (Lewis 2003); location within the bureau
cratic structure seems to matter (Wood and Waterman 1994). On this view, the EPA,
located outside of other agencies on the existing organizational chart of the bureaucracy
is more independent than a sub-agency of the Department of Interior.
Greater functional independence also results when Congress places limitations on the
President's ability to appoint or remove agency heads, as the legal definition emphasizes.
If the President can remove the head of an agency for the failure to do as the President
directs, the agency is not insulated in any serious way. More insulation is also associ
ated with a commission or board structure, especially when combined with partisanship
requirements and staggered terms (O'Connell 2009; Ho 2007; Strauss 1984). Statutory
requirements for commissions may specify the length of term for members of a commis
sion, require representation of both parties on the board, or limit the President's ability
to remove commissioners; in comparison, the administrator of the EPA may be freely
removed by the President (O'Connell 2009). The empirical evidence about the impact of
these mechanisms, however, is mixed (O'Connell 2009). Hedge and Johnson (2002) find
the EEOC and NRC allegedly more insulated agencies - reduced regulation imme
diately after the RepUblicans took control of Congress in 1995. Weingast and Moran
(1983) found that the FTC was surprisingly sensitive to changes in the composition of its
congressional oversight committee.
The President's historical efforts to use appointments to control the bureaucracy
should not be surprising (see Weko 1995; Hammond and Hill 1993; Moe 1985; Nathan
1983). Indeed, many Presidents have sought to reorganize the bureaucracy in the hopes
of gaining greater control (Arnold 1998; Graves 1949). Presidents tend to prefer that
agencies be located within the cabinet hierarchy and headed by appointees of their
choosing (Lewis 2003; Moe 1989). Yet, it is ultimately the President who must sign legis
lation creating agencies and therefore presumably the signing Presidents approved of at
least some agency insulation.
Principal responsibility for agency design generally starts with Congress (Lewis 2003).
Why would Congress prefer to insulate the bureaucracy from Presidential control? The
conventional public choice wisdom is that Congress manipulates the structure of agen
cies so as to guard against opportunism by political actors later (Lewis 2004). Insulating
characteristics guard against the hijacking of policy by the President or a future-period
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legislature (Moe 1989). The risk of legislative drift on the one hand and bureaucratic
or presidential drift on the other means that insulation from future period political
control may best ensure the durability of current period policy preferences (Epstein and
O'Halloran 1999, 1994). Of course, the desire to insulate will depend on many factors,
including the degree of preference divergence between Congress and the President, the
median legislator of the floor and committees, and the rapidity of turnover within the
legislature (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999).
A second justification for insulation has to do with the trade off of technocratic exper
tise against democratic accountability. Because insulated agencies are less accountable
and harder to control not just for the President but also for Congress insulation
is also a strategy for allowing agencies to utilize expertise without short-term political
pressure. This is a standard account of central bank independence both in the United
States and abroad. Insulation lessens political pressure on agencies, which may in the
long tenu result in more effective public policy. This same logic motivated much of
the early debate about a professional civil service versus a system of patronage in the
bureaucracy.
One of the major contributions of pu blic choice in recent years has been to reassert and
rigorously analyze the role of the President (for example, Canes-Wrone 2009; 2006). In
public law, the dominant trend in executive design scholarship has been a push towards
greater centralized control, either as a constitutional matter as in the unitary executive
debate or as a regulatory matter as in the Presidential Administration school of agency
action (Kagan 200 I). In this world of partial control exercised both by the President and
the legislature, inherent agency problems may mean less accountability of the bureauc
racy overall (Moe and Caldwell 1994; Hammond and Knott 1996). Because agencies
must answer to both Congress and the President, the underlying model is really one of
multiple principals (Biber 2009). Agencies are assigned tasks for which the President may
favor one outcome while Congress may favor another. Seemingly inconsistent policy
pronouncements by an agency, may in fact be a rational response to conflicting pressure
from other political institutions.
Related, the Constitution's hybrid appointments scheme- the President proposing
someone for office and the Senate giving consent provides for a natural conflict or
at least negotiation point between the two branches (McCarty and Razaghian 1999).
When the legislature has proposal power over resources given to bureaucrats but has
limited control over personnel, except through confinuation of the President's choices
(Noken and Sala 2000), outcomes can be inefficient (McCarty 2004). If the President
selects an official whose preferences diverge too much from those of the legislature, the
legislature responds by reducing resources available to the agency (ibid). This appoint
ments dilemma can be solved by centralizing appointment and budgetary authority
in the same institution, or minimized by restricting the President's removal power.
By restricting the President's ability to control officials after they are put in office, the
President can commit to a more moderate agency, which would in turn induce greater
resources from Congress. The basic intuition is that if the President exerts a lot of ex
post control of policy (and has preferences different than Congress), then the legislature
will be hesitant to give the bureaucracy a lot of resources or discretion. The appoint
ments dilemma thus puts another possible positive gloss on insulation of agencies from
presidential control.
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B. The unitary executive
One of the more active public law disputes about agency design as of late has grown
out of the unitary executive debates. Many pages in the law reviews and Supreme Court
reporters have been filled with fights about whether the President must be given strong,
weak, or complete hierarchical control over all administrative officials. May Congress
restrict the President's ability to remove an officer appointed by the President? Does
the President have the authority to negate the judgments of any and all administrative
officials? On one view, independent agencies those headed by officials who cannot be
removed by the President without good cause are legally uncontroversial. On the other,
they are inconsistent with explicit and implicit design principles of Article II.
Properly understood, the unitary executive debate is about the extent of hierarchical
control over executive or administrative officers that the Constitution establishes. The
contours of the doctrinal debate have remained largely unchanged for many years, with
Humphrey's Executor v United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), and Myers v United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926), providing the key building blocks for modern doctrine.
In Myers, the Supreme Court held that the President's right to remove officers whom he
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate cannot be restricted by Congress
(272 U.S. at 176). However, in Humphrey's Executor, the Court concluded that the
President does not have unlimited removal power over individuals who serve in a quasi
legislative or quasi-judicial position (295 U.S. at 629). The doctrinal idea here is that
the President must be given almost unilateral control over officers exercising pure or
core executive authority, but that Congress may restrict either appointment or removal
powers for officers exercising more peripheral authority. More recently, Morrison v.
Olsen, 487 U.S. 654 (l988), upheld the Independent Counsel Act, concluding that an
Independent Prosecutor that could not be removed by the President at will is consistent
with any constitutional limits.
Part of the constitutional debate about the unitary executive is historical, asking
whether executive authority would have been understood by the founding generation to
require strong vertical control over all executive officials (Calabresi and Yoo 2008). Yet,
increasingly, the debate has turned from historical analysis to pragmatic questions about
how enhancing executive control over administrative agencies would affect executive
efficiency and efficacy. That is, does strong vertical control by an executive over the entire
bureaucracy support or undermine government performance? What the US Constitution
actually requires on this front is an issue for another day, but there is an inevitable class
of pragmatic questions about the design and performance of agencies that are a growing
part of the unitary executive debate.
The main pragmatic justification for strong vertical control of agencies in the bureauc
racy is that unitary structure enhances accountability and responsiveness that is,
reduces slack in government. If the President cannot control the decisions that agencies
make, then the public will not be able to reward or sanction the President effectively
for agency behavior. Nor will agencies be effectively controlled by the President, and
therefore agencies might implement their own preferences or shirk too much, or so the
argument goes.
Although this view is superficially appealing, it has recently been questioned by two
separate public choice attacks. First, Stephenson (2008) shows that a single unitary
executive does not always represent voter preferences better than an independent agency.
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Voters (should) care not just about the average policy position of a given President, but
also the variance of those policy positions. Insulation of agencies can sometimes reduce
the variance of policy decisions avoiding large shifts from an extreme on the Left to an
extreme on the Right. By reducing short-term political control of agencies, independent
agencies might produce policy that is more consistently close to median public prefer
ences, notwithstanding the lack of presidential democratic control. On this view, insula
tion produces biased agency decisions, but a little bit of bias may be preferable to the
high variance of strong presidential control.
Second, Berry and Gersen (2008) propose that an executive regime in which agency
heads are directly elected by the public rather than indirectly chosen by the President
would provide greater government responsiveness than imposing strong vertical control
over the bureaucracy. They propose that directly electing the head of the Department
of Education would enhance both the selection effects and the incentive effects of elec
tions. If the goal of the unitary executive is accountability to the public, then directly
electing agency heads might better facilitate those goals than granting strong vertical
control.
Even if true, the direct election of agency heads might generate other design problems,
for example sacrificing policy uniformity or coordination. The legal value of uniformity
concerns the similar application of one legal principle in many different settings. That is,
uniformity is about consistent application of law within a policy dimension. Serving the
interests of uniformity is sometimes said to require strong vertical control over agencies
because an executive without that authority might not be able to ensure that different
subordinates always apply the law in identical or at least similar ways. Yet, in the unitary
executive structure, there is ultimately one person who must ensure the uniform imple
mentation of federal law across dozens or even hundreds of different policy domains.
If each agency head were directly elected, there would be a single official to ensure the
uniform implementation and application of federal law in a single policy domain, like the
environment. This is difficult too, but it seems an order of magnitude less difficult than
in unitary executive cases.
The unitary executive advocates also emphasize that a single strong executive is better
able to coordinate related policies and make sensible trade offs across policies. Public
choice, however, counsels that it is a mistake to equate centralization (strong verti
cal hierarchical control) with coordination. Centralization is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for coordination. Strong vertical control over subordinates may
facilitate coordination, but there is no shortage of lackadaisical supervisors in bureauc
racies, be they public or private. Moreover, the key to effective coordination is aeeurate
information. The centralized official the chief executive must depend on infonnation
provided by the decentralized agencies whose policy decisions are to be coordinated.
If the preferences of agency heads happen to coincide with the 'coordinated outcome',
then centralization or vertical control is unnecessary. In the more likely scenario that
agency preferences diverge from the coordinated outcome, there is a risk that agency
heads will reveal biased information to the presidential supervisor to push outcomes
toward their own preferences. Therefore, the selected coordinated policy will not tend
towards the first-best coordinated outcome that would be based on accurate informa
tion from agency heads. Instead, it will be a second-best coordinated outcome based on
biased information. This seeond-best coordinated policy could be better or worse than
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the uncoordinated decisions of agencies without vertical control because agencies would
then have better incentives to reveal accurate information about the right policy in their
respective domains (Alonso et al. 2008).
IV.

Redundancy and overlapping authority

This part shifts from mechanisms of vertical control to horizontal relations among
agencies. To reiterate a now familiar theme, a main task for agency design is to take
advantage of agency expertise, while ensuring that the agency exerts high levels of effort
and implements policy consistent with the views of enacting coalition. As agencies are
given greater discretion, there is also an enhanced risk that the agency wiII act poorly.
As discretion is restrieted, the risk of agency drift decreases, but so too does the benefit
that accrues from agency expertise. Closely related to this problem is the following
decision: conditional on an affirmative decision to delegate to some bureaucratic entity,
should authority be delegated to a single agency or several different agencies (Chisholm
1989)?
A. Theorizing jurisdiction
There are two dominant ways of thinking about this question. The first abstracts away
from the principal-agent problems that motivate most of the modern field and imagines
bureaucratic structure to be a problem of engineering. When the same task is given to
two different agencies, there is duplication of administrative efforts, which entails some
redundant costs and therefore potential waste or inefficiency. It is rare to hire two com
panies to collect the same garbage on the same day. On the other hand, redundancy
is a standard design principle in both engineering and organizations (O'Connell 2006;
Lerner 1986). Modern cars have both seat belts and airbags notwithstanding the fact
that neither airbags nor seat belts would be sufficient to protect against injury in many
accidents. Likewise modern jumbo jets are designed with multiple engines; in the case
of a single engine failure, the other engine is typically sufficient to land safely. There is a
cost to the partially duplicative safety measures, but it is not hard to imagine a scenario
where the additional cost is worth the reduction in potential accident costs (Heimann
1993; Landau 1991, 1969; Wilson 1989).
Early work on duplication and overlap in the bureaucraey arose primarily in the field
of public administration. Bureaueratic redundaney was sometimes eriticized as govern
ment waste and public administration scholars sought to understand precisely when and
where duplication is desirable (Wilson 1989). More duplication will generally be more
costly, but also will reduce the probability of organizational failure, particularly if effort
and errors are not correlated across agencies or divisions (Bendor 1985).
This approach has much to recommend it, but the tradition of public choice recog
nized that it is not quite right to model administrative agencies as components of an
engine. Because policy decisions are made by individuals or collections of individuals in
organizations, individuals react strategically to the extent of redundancy or jurisdictional
overlap (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). Political principals often observe only a single
policy output either success or failure that is itself jointly produced by the effort of
overlapping organizations (Holmstrom 1982). So long as agents in organizations prefer
shirking to working, redundancy not only produces efficiency losses from duplication,
but it can also result in less effort by the multiple agents (Brehm and Gates 1997), or
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organizational failures that result from complex interactions of different decentralized
decision-makers (Perrow 1984).
To make headway on the strategic design problem, Ting (2003, 2002) uses a model
in which the choice by principals about the extent of redundancy and the effort levels
of selected agents are endogenously derived. He concludes, first, that policy choices by
agents in a redundant organizational scheme impose both positive and negative exter
nalities on other organizational actors when the policy technology is statistically inde
pendent (generally producing less effort by each individual in the redundancy scheme).
Second, the extent of negative externality varies as a function of the divergence between
the preferences of the principal and the agents. Redundancy produces policies closer
to the preferences of the principal when the preferences of agencies are far from the
principal's. However, when the agent's preferences are close, free-riding produces worse
outcomes in the redundant scheme. Finally, Ting suggests that, in repeated settings,
even unfriendly agents can be induced to choose policy close to the principal's with the
threat of termination. Such a regime induces the redundant agents to compete against
each other, potentially producing policy more consistent with congressional preferences
(Niskanen 1971; Miller and Moe 1983; Landau 1991). Although theoretical formula
tions of this idea vary, the basic intuition is to create a regime in which agencies compete
to obtain or to avoid losing resources - usually funding or staff but sometimes even the
extent of jurisdiction itself and in the process compete away the rents that would oth
erwise accrue. Even more simply, redundancy or overlap can prevent capture of agencies
because an interest group must bear greater costs to capture several agencies instead
of just one (O'Connell 2006; Berkowitz and Goodman 2000; Laffont and Martimort
1999).
A final view is that jurisdictional overlap or equivalently, redundancy results from
political compromise in the legislature (for example, Moe 1989). Interest groups may
express preferences not only about the substance of policy, but also the agency to which
policy discretion is delegated. As policy is formulated over time, groups in one time
period may advocate delegation to one agency while groups in a different time may
prefer delegation to another. Over time, one would expect to see precisely the sort of
partial jurisdictional overlap that is on display in so many actual policy areas. Before the
reorganization of disaster planning and response, literally dozens of agencies adminis
tered various parts of the federal disaster response regime.
Redundancy within the bureaucracy creates the opportunity not just for agency shirk
ing, but also for agency conflicts (Gersen 2007; Weaver 1991; Johnson 1987). Particularly
when multiple agencies administer different parts of the same statutory scheme, agencies
may give conflicting interpretations to statutory terms or meanings, leaving litigants and
courts to resolve the conflict. Administrative law doctrine has evolved to help resolve
these disputes, but typically requires courts to pick one agency as the primary one in
charge. This doctrine may resolve the immediate controversy, but it also undermines
Congress's ability to use overlapping schemes to enhance bureaucratic reliability, control
adverse selection, and minimize moral hazard (Gersen 2007).
Because the field largely evolved as a way to understand redundancy and duplica
tion, the question of underlapping as opposed to overlapping jurisdictional assignment
has received relatively little attention. Frequently, however, it is not clear whether an
agency has authority to act in some domain, or alternatively whether one, two, or no
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agencies have authority. Ambiguity about whether two agencies have statutory author
ity is closely related to ambiguity about whether neither does. Many of the same insights
about redundancy and team production can be applied to this problem as well.
The implicit logic of the agency-competition model is that Congress can reward or
sanction agencies for their failure to perform (compare Macey 1992). Typically, the
dimensions to adjust to generate these incentives involve budgets or staff; however, as
noted, there is also a tradition in public choice that views agents as seekers of empires
or growing jurisdictional authority (Levinson 2005). If jurisdiction can be shrunken or
expanded to generate agency incentives, it is also possible that Congress would delib
erately create ambiguity about which of several agencies has authority in some area.
Agencies might then develop expertise and assert authority in order to expand their own
jurisdiction (Gersen 2007). As Stephenson points out in his chapter of this volume, this
might create an undesirable race-to-be-first. Nevertheless, the basic point that jurisdic
tional underlap or ambiguity about jurisdictional boundaries may be used strategically
by Congress in order to generate incentives for agency behavior.
B. Administrative law ofoverlap
As one court recently noted, 'we live in an age of overlapping and concurring regula
tory jurisdiction'. (FTC v Ken Roberts Co, 276 F.3d 583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001)), quoting
Thompson Medical Co. v FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Unfortunately, these
statutes have led to persistent confusion in public law circles, confusion that might be
clarified using some basic insights from public choice.
Suppose Congress is considering enacting a new statute to address some policy
domain. Conceptually, Congress might allocate authority in any number of ways, but
consider two dimensions of variation: exclusivity and completeness. With respect to
exclusivity, Congress might grant authority to one agency alone or several. With respeet
to completeness, Congress might delegate authority to act over the entire policy space
or only a subset of the space. If two agencies receive concurrent authority to regulate in
a field, there is jurisdictional overlap. When neither gets authority, there is jurisdictional
underlap. In the administrative law context, these jurisdictional disputes are most likely
to rear their heads in the Chevron doctrine. When both agencies offer conflicting interpre
tations of a statute, which agency, if any, should receive deference from the courts?
The conventional wisdom had it that such agencies have neither a greater claim to
democratic accountability nor special expertise and therefore deference to interpreta
tion of shared jurisdiction statutes - statutes administered by mUltiple agencies was
inappropriate. One reason for courts to defer to agencies is that agencies have greater
expertise than courts. If redundancy and team production creates shirking and shirking
undermines expertise or judgment, perhaps courts should be rightly hesitant to defer
agencies in concurrent jurisdiction schemes. This view would be something akin to a
public choice justification for the court's lack of deference to agencies in these settings.
By the same token, when several agencies share responsibility for administering a statute,
any or all of them might have more expertise than the courts. To say that multiple agen
cies administer a statute is to say that several agencies regularly utilize the statute and
apply it in the context of their specific policy domain. So long as statutory interpretation
is partially policy-making, agencies possessing greater familiarity with underlying policy
issues should do better than generalist courts.
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Setting aside agency expertise, a second reason courts might defer is the better demo
cratic pedigree of agencies relative to courts. Similar public choice ideas apply here as
well. To say that agencies are accountable is to say that the slack created by delegation
is not too severe. But, the severity of the agency problem will, as the literature suggests,
be a function of incentive schemes created by the overlapping jurisdiction statutes. If
statutory schemes are carefully crafted, redundancy may generate competition among
agencies, causing them to compete away rents they would otherwise enjoy, generating
policy closer to congressional preferences (O'Connnell, 2006; Macey 1992). On this view,
two agencies with concurrent jurisdiction will generally be more democratically respon
sive than one agency administering a statute alone. By the same token, sometimes shared
policy authority makes it more difficult to craft an effective incentive mechanism because
responsibility for policy success or failure cannot be easily assigned to the right agency.
Consider agency interpretations of general statutes - statutes that bear on the busi
ness of multiple agencies like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) or National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 'It is universally agreed that no single agency with
enforcement power has been charged with administration of these statutes. and hence
that Chevron does not apply' (Merrill and Hickman 2001, 893). Similarly, no deference
is given to agency interpretations of the APA because '[tJhe APA is not a statute that
the Director is charged with administering' (Metropolitan Stevedore Co. v Rambo, 521
U.S. 121, 137 (1997) (internal citations omitted». Congress should not be taken to have
implicitly delegated law-interpreting authority to any agency because no agency admin
isters the statute. Indeed, lower courts generally do not defer to agency views in these
settings. largely on expertise grounds. 5 In Professional Reactor Operator Society v NRC,
939 F.2d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The D.C. Circuit refused to give Chevron deference to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's interpretation of the APA because the 'Supreme
Court has indicated ... that reviewing courts do not owe the same deference to an
agency's interpretation of statutes that, like the APA, are outside the agency's particular
expertise and special charge to administer' (ibid, 1051).
Not giving deference to an agency's view of a statute that it does not administer implies
little about whether deference is warranted for agency views of a statute that multiple
agencies do administer. Unfortunately, the same basic analysis is often applied. In Sutton
v United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (999), the Court emphasized that no agency was
given authority to issue regulations for the applicable provisions of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), even though multiple agencies clearly had authority to admin
ister other portions of the ADA. The Court chose to treat one portion of the statute as
'administered by no agency' notwithstanding that the statute itself was administered
by multiple agencies. Even Justice Breyer, in dissent, would have given deference to the
agency only because the term at issue - 'disability' - was used both in the portion of the
statute the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administers and in
the more general portion of the statute not solely administered by the EEOC.
In many cases of concurrent jurisdiction, courts go to great length either to conclude
that no agency was given law-interpreting authority or to conclude that only one agency
was given law-interpreting authority (California v Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979»,
involved the question of whether the EPA and the Secretary of Interior had concur
rent jurisdiction over air quality on off-shore oil rigs. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
there was no overlapping jurisdiction because such authority would 'impair or frus
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trate the authority which [the statute] grants to the secretary' (ibid, 1193--4). Similarly.
in Martin v Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144 (1991),
the Supreme Court was faced with a conflict between the Secretary of Labor and the
Health Review Commission, both of whom have responsibility for implementing the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (Weaver 1991; Johnson 1987). The Court rejected
the Commission's interpretation, holding that the Secretary was the agency entitled to
deference, not the Commission. The Supreme Court appeared to rely on a presumption
that Congress delegates law-interpreting authority (today the marker of when Chevron
deference should apply) to a single agency:
Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first instance for the
presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the agency rather than
to the reviewing court, we presume here that Congress intended to invest interpretive power in
the administrative actor in the best position to develop these attributes. (Marlin, 499 U.S. at
153.)

This language seems to amount to a presumption of exclusive jurisdiction: when
Congress delegates power to the executive, it presumably gives law-interpreting author
ity only to a single agency (Gersen 2007). Because this inquiry is now part of the quali
fication for Chevron deference (Sunstein 2006), the presumption makes truly concurrent
law-interpreting authority unlikely on the ground. It also reduces the effectiveness and
increases the costs of using redundancy to control agency behavior. Such a presumption
might not be tragic on its own, but in effect it imposes an additional cost on Congress for
using overlapping jurisdiction schemes and the public choice literature shows that such
schemes can sometimes be an effective way to discipline agencies.
Alternatively, the presumption might be grounded in a democracy-forcing idea that
is also consistent with some public choice work. Presuming that Congress does not give
concurrent jurisdiction might facilitate greater democratic accountability because there
is always one and only one agency that has the authority to act with the force of law in a
given policy domain. Citizens would know to whom to direct complaints and about whom
to complain to Congress. Some models emphasize that principals can more easily hold
agents accountable when there is clarity about which agent is responsible for which actions
(and outcomes). Perhaps the exclusive jurisdiction presumption tries to support clarity
in government structure. If the presumption merely requires that Congress speak clearly
when delegating law-interpreting authority to multiple agencies, perhaps enhanced insti
tutional clarity allows citizens to monitor Congress and reward or punish accordingly.
How do such schemes affect the ability and cost of interest groups monitoring agencies?
If overlapping jurisdiction statutes produce confusion rather than clarity about which
agency is responsible for which action, interest groups will be forced to monitor multiple
agencies, which will increase the costs of monitoring and influencing the bureaucracy.
Whether this is good or bad normatively, it would seem to be an effect Congress would
care about if genuine. Monitoring is not costless and overlapping schemes affect the
magnitude and distribution of these costs. The exclusive jurisdiction presumption might
also be understood as a way to economize on these costs.
The cases themselves seem to ground the presumption in the idea of agency exper
tise. As between two agencies, courts should presume that Congress delegated law
interpreting authority to the more expert agency rather than the less expert agency. In
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Gonzales v Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), one reason the majority did not defer to the
Attorney General's interpretation was that the Attorney General was said to lack the
relevant expertise. The majority concluded the Secretary of Health and Human Services
was given exclusive interpretive authority regarding health and medical practices. When
one agency has greater expertise than another agency, it is not ludicrous to suggest courts
should defer to the more expert one. Yet, this is a static and exogenous understanding of
expertise that public choice suggests is also wrong. If concurrent jurisdictional schemes
facilitate the development of agency expertise by rewarding agencies who develop exper
tise with increases in authority, then the exclusive jurisdiction presumption undermines
the precise goal the presumption is supposed to serve.
A statute that allocates authority to multiple government entities relies on compet
ing agents as a mechanism for managing agency problems. If Congress wants to take
advantage of agency knowledge, but is concerned that agencies will shirk and fail to
invest heavily enough in the development of expertise, manipulatingjurisdiction can help
manage that possibility. If one agency invests in developing expertise and the other does
not, Congress can give the agency that invested in expertise exclusive authority. With
two agents exercising concurrent authority, the idea would be to design an incentive
scheme that gets them to compete away the rents from their informational advantage
(Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). The presumption of exclusive jurisdiction undermines
a potentially important set of mechanisms with which Congress creates desirable incen
tives for agencies. If Congress utilizes concurrent agency jurisdiction to constrain the
behavior of those agencies so as to align outcomes more closely with the preferences
of Congress, then the presumption of exclusive jurisdiction is democracy-undermining
rather than democracy-reinforcing. The presumption produces an artificial increase in
the cost of utilizing certain statutory structures to control agencies. The point is not that
Congress would always prefer this regime, but only that Congress would not always
prefer the alternative.
Overlapping jurisdiction is not necessarily an ideal structure for delegation. As noted,
redundancy in the assignment of bureaucratic tasks can also create duplicative monitor
ing and enforcement costs (Whitford 2003; McGuire et al. 1979; Miller and Moe 1983).
And as Stephenson emphasizes in his chapter of this volume, this proposed alternative
might generate at least two problems: the possibility of inconsistent interpretations of a
statute and a race to the courthouse steps. Said one court, '[giving deference] would lay
the groundwork for a regulatory regime in which either the same statute is interpreted
differently by the several agencies or the one agency that happens to reach the courthouse
first is allowed to fix the meaning of the text for all' (Rapaport v u.s. Department of
Treasury, 59 F.3d 212, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1995».
Even if superficially unseemly, there is nothing inherently troubling about a statutory
term having different meanings in different policy spheres. Chevron is supposed to open
up policy discretion for agencies that have significant expertise in the fields they regulate.
When a single agency administers a statute that uses the same term in different parts of
the statute, the term may be defined differently so long as there is a sufficient justification
for doing so. Similarly, a single agency is free to offer two different interpretations of a
statutory term in two different time periods so long as adequate justification is given for
the difference, as in the original Chevron case. It is no more objectionable when two agen
cies do so, than when one does so.
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The race to the courthouse steps may have been a genuine problem at one point. But
the ideas embraced by National Cable & Telecommunications Association I' Brand X
internet Service, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), suggest otherwise today. In Brand X, the Court
clarified the relationship between a prior judicial interpretation of a statute and an
agency's subsequent and different interpretation of the same term (Bamberger 2002).
The Brand X majority held that a 'court's prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the
prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms
of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion' (545 U.S. at 982). Put
differently, when a court rejects an agency position because the statute unambiguously
requires the interpretation the court adopted (Chevron Step 1), the agency may not
later adopt a different position. When a court acknowledges statutory ambiguity but
acknowledges the agency's interpretation is reasonable (Chevron Step 2), the agency
maintains the flexibility to pick new interpretations in the future. In effect, the agency
may subsequently pick an interpretation different from the one the prior court thought
best. When a court finds that a statute requires a given interpretation, the agency is
bound; when a court finds merely that an agency position is permitted, the agency is
not.
The question is obviously different when two different agencies offer two different
statutory interpretations at different points in time. But Brand X clarifies that first in
time need not imply first in right with respect to agency statutory interpretation. One
agency's interpretation upheld by the courts in one time period need only bind another
agency interpretation if it is required by the statute rather than merely permitted. But if
the interpretation is required by the statute (Step One), the same result would be required
no matter which agency litigated the issue and with or without a deference regime.
Congress spoke clearly and mandated the specific interpretation. If Congress did not
clearly resolve the interpretive question, both agencies would remain free to adopt
alternative interpretations in the future, irrespective of which agency first breached the
courthouse door. Like Chevron itself, Brand X is flexibility-preserving, and deference to
agency interpretations of overlapping jurisdiction statutes is perfectly in keeping with
that impulse. Although it remains to be seen whether the courts will take account ofPPT
and public choice work in this context, there seems to be an emergent view in the legal
academy that they should (Bressman 2008).
Conclusion
This chapter sought to discuss some of the vast public choice literature on administra
tive agencies and apply relevant insights to active doctrinal disputes in the public law of
agency design. Given that the public choice of agency design could easily constitute an
entire volume by itself, this chapter is inevitably incomplete on many dimensions. Rather
than an attempt at comprehensiveness that would be destined for failure, therefore, the
chapter sought to at least gesture at the major themes and much of the prominent work.
While the chapter sought mainly to take insights from public choice and apply them to
the public law of agency design, it is also true that greater attention to real disputes in
public law could make for more accurate and rigorous theoretical models. Just as the
public law of agency design has much to learn from public choice, public choice theories
of agency design might learn a good bit from public law as well.
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Notes
l.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law SchooL This chapter benefited from very useful
comments from Dan Farber, Anne Joseph O'Connell, and Matthew Stephenson. Excellent research assist
ance was provided by Monica Groat.
Carpenter (2001) and Skowronek (1982) provide very useful historicaJ treatments.
See, for example, Dole I' United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White. J .• dissenting); Social Securily
Board v Nieretko. 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) CAn agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory
power.).
Lewis, for example, treats the EPA as an independent agency because it is not located within the cabinet
hierarchy. It is a stand-alone agency in this sense, even though the head of the EPA is selected by the
President without partisan requirements or limitations on the removal power.
See. for example, DuBois v United States Department of Agriculture, 102 F.3d 1273, 1285 n. 15 (1st Cif.
1996) (declining to apply Chevron to NEPA 'because we [the court] are not reviewing an agency's interpre
tation of the statute that it was directed to enforce'). However, even here it is not clear shared jurisdiction
is the appropriate framework for analysis. At least on the court's own terms, the correct parallel is whether
the agency is one of several that enforces the statute. A somewhat stronger case is Reporters Comm'n for
Freedom ofthe Press v United States Dept. ofJust ice, 816 F.2d 730, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ('[N]o one execu
tive branch entity is entrusted with [FOrA's] primary interpretation'), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 749
(1989).

References
Aberbach, Joel D. (1990), Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight, Washington, DC:
Brookings.
Aghion, Philippe and Jean Tirole (1997), 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political
Economy, 105, 1-29.
Alonso, Ricardo, Wouter Dessein, and Niko Matouschek (2008), 'When Does Coordination Require
Centralization', American Economic Review, 98: 145-79.
Anthony, Robert A. (I 994), 'Interpretive Rules, Legislative Rules and Spurious Rules: Lifting the Smog',
Administrative Law Journal of American University, 8, 1·22.
Armstrong, Timothy K. (2004), 'Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest', Cornell Journal or Law and
Public Policy, 13, 203-87.
Arnold, R. Douglas (1998), 'The Political Feasibility of Social Security Reform', in Framing the Social Security
Debale, R. Douglas Arnold, Michael J. Graetz and Alicia H. Munnell (eds), Washington, DC: Brookings,
pp.389--421.
Arnold, R. Douglas (1987), 'Po1iticaJ Control of Administrative Officials', Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, 3, 279-86.
Balla, Steven J. (I 998), 'Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy', American
Political Science Review, 92: 663-73.
Bamberger, Kenneth A. (2002), 'Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative Policymaking'.
New York University Law Review, 77, 1272-321.
Bawn, Kathleen (1997), 'Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight
and the Committee System'. Journal ofLali'. Economics and Organization, 13, 101-26.
Bawn, Kathleen (1995), 'Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Administrative
Procedures', American Political Science RevieHl, 89(1),62-73.
Bendor, Jonathan B. (1985), Parallel Systems: Redundancy in Government, Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Bendor, Jonathan and Adam Meirowitz (2004), 'Spatial Models of Delegation', American Political Science
Review, 98(2), 293-310.
Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allen E. Goodman (2000), Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age, New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Berry, Christopher, Ben; C. Burden, and William G. Howell (2007), 'Matters of Life and Death: The
Durability of Discretionary Programs 1970-2004' (working paper).
Berry, Christopher and Jacob E. Gersen (2008), The Unbundled Executive', University of Chicago Law
Review, 75(4), 1385--434
Biber, Eric (2009), 'Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies',
Harvard Environmental Law Review, 33(1).1-62.
Blais, Andre and Stephane Dion (eds), (1991), The Budget Maximizing Bureaucrat: Appraisals and Evidence,
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, Cambridge: :MIT Press.

Brehm, John and Scott Gates
Puhlic, Ann Arbor. MI: Ur
Brehm, John and Scott Gate:
Police Behavior', American
Bressman, Lisa Schultz (2009
Calabresi, Steven and John)
New Haven: Yale Universi
Callander, Steven (2008), 'A .
Calvert, Randall, Mathew D
Agency Discretion', Ameri
Canes-Wrone, Brandice (20(
Edwards, III and William
University Press.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice (20e
Chicago Press.
Carpenter, Daniel P., Evan
Problems', New England J
Carpenter, Daniel P. (2001
Innovation in Executive All
Chisholm, Donald (1989),
Svstems, Berkeley: Univer
Dodd, Lawrence C. and Ric
Downs, Anthony (1989), Ins
Dutfy. John F. (1998), 'Adm
Eisner, Marc Allen and Ken
the Regan Revolution in !
Epstein, David and Sharyn !
Epstein, David and Shary
Discretion', American Jot,
Ferejohn, John A. (1987), '1
Sullivan, (eds), Congress:
de Figueiredo, RuI. J.P., J
American Political Scienc
Gailmard, Sean (2002), 'Ex
Organization, 18,536-55.
Gersen, Jacob E (2007), '0'
Rew'eli" 2006.201--47.
Gersen, Jacob E. and An
Pennsrlvania Law ReviclI
Gersen, )acob E. and Eric I
54389.
Graves. W. Brooke (1949)
Washington DC: Librar~
Hamilton, James T. and C
Proeedures: The Selecti
Contemporary Prohlems,
Hammond, Thomas H. an
of Presidential Nominee
Hammond, Thomas H. a
Congressional Dominan
Policy-Making', Journal
Hedge, David and Rene
Congressional Control
333-51.
Heimann, C.F. Larry (I (
Design of Reliable Syst.
Hill, Jeffrey S. and James I
the Structure and Proce
Ho, Daniel E. (2007), '0
Regulation' (working p
Holmstrom, Bengt (1982)

Designing agencies

359

Brehm, lohn and Scott Gates (1997), Working. Shirking. and Sabotage: Bureaucratic Response to a Democratic
Public, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press,
Brehm, John and Scott Gates (1993), 'Donut Shops and Speed Traps: Evaluating Models of Supervision on
Police Behavior', American Juurnal or Political Science, 37,555-81.
Bressman, Lisa Schultz (2009). 'Chevr~n's Mistake', Duke Law Journal, 58, 549-621.
Calabresi, Steven and John Yoo (2008), The Unitary Executive: Presidential Po werj'rom Washington to Bush.
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Callander, Steven (2008), 'A Theory of Policy Expertise', Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 3(2), 123-40,
Calvert, Randall, Mathew D. McCubbins. and Barry R, Weingast (1989). 'A Theory of Political Control and
Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political Science, 33, 588-611.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice (2009), 'Game Theory and the Study of the American Presidency" in George C
Edwards, III and William Howell (eds), Oxj<)rd Handbook on the American Presidency, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice (2006), Who Leads Whom,' Presidents. Policy and the Public, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Carpenter, Daniel P., Evan lames Zucker and Jerry Avorn (2008), 'Drug-Review Deadlines and Safety
Problems', New England JOllrnal of Medicine, 358,1354-61.
Carpenter, Daniel P. (2001), The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks, and Policy
Innol'Qtion in ExecUlil'l! Agencies, 1862-1928, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chisholm, Donald (1989), Coordination Without Hierarchy: In/'ol'lnal StruC!lIres in Mulliorgani:!ational
Systems, Berkeley: University of California Press.
Dodd, Lawrence C. and Richard L. Schott (1979), Congress and the Administrative State, New York: Wiley,
Downs, Anthony (1989), Inside Bureaucracy, New York: Little, Brown.
Duffy,lohn F, (1998), 'Administrative Common Law in ludicial Review', Texas LIm Re\';ew, 77(1), 113-214.
Eisner, Marc Allen and Kenneth J, Meier (1990), 'Presidential Control versus Bureaucratic Power: Explaining
the Regan Revolution in Antitrust', American Journal of Political Science, 34, 269-87,
Epstein. David and Sharyn O'Halloran (1999), Delegating POlletS, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran (1994), 'Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency
Discretion', American Journal ofPo /iIi cal Science, 38, 697-722.
Ferejohn, John A. (1987), 'The Structure of Agency Decision Processes', in Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry
Sullivan, (eds), Congress: Structure and Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp, 441-61.
de Figueiredo, Rui, J.P., lr (2002), 'Electoral Competition Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation',
American Political Science Review, 96,321-33.
Gailmard, Sean (2002). 'Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion', Journal of Law. Economic.l· and
Organization, 18,536-55.
Gersen, Jacob E (2007), 'Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law', Supreme Court
Review 2006,201-47,
Gersen, Jacob E, and Anne loseph O'Connell (2008), 'Deadlines in Administrative Law', Universitv of
Pennsylvania Law Review, 156, 923~90
Gersen, lacob E. and Eric A. Posner (2007), Timing Rules and Legal Institutions', Harvard Law Reviel\!. 121,
543-89.
Graves, W. Brooke (\949), Reorgani:cation of the Executive Branch of the Government of the United Stales,
Washington DC: Library of Congress.
Hamilton, James T. and Christopher Schroeder (1994), 'Strategic Regulators and the Choice of Rulemaking
Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste', Law and
Contemporary Problems, 57, 111--60.
Hammond, Thomas H, and leffrey S, Hill (1993), 'Deference or Preference? Explaining Senate Confirmation
of Presidential Nominees to Administrative Agencies', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 5, 23- 59.
Hammond, Thomas H, and lack H, Knott (1996), 'Who Controls the Bureaucracy? Presidential Power,
Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional
Policy-Making', Journal of Law, Economics and Organi:catiol1, 12, 119-66,
Hedge, David and Renee 1. Johnson (2002), 'The Plot that Failed: The Republican Revolution and
Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy', Journal of Public Administratiol1 Research and Theory, 12(3),
333-51.
Heimann, CF. Larry (1993), 'Understanding the Challenger Disaster: Organizational Structure and the
Design of Reliable Systems', American Political Science Review, 87, 421-35.
Hill, leffrey S. and lames E. Brazier (1991), 'Constraining Administrative Decisions: A Critical Examination of
the Structure and Process Hypothesis', Journal of Law. Economics and Organization, 7(2), 373-400.
Ho, Daniel E. (2007), 'Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan Requirements on
Regulation' (working paper),
Holmstrom, Bengt (1982), 'Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal a/Economics, 13(2),324-40,

360

Research handbook on public choice and public law

Hom, Murray 1. (1995), The Political Economy ol Public Administration, New York: Cambridge University
Press,
Howell, William G. and David E, Lewis (2002), 'Ageneies by Presidential Design'. Journal of Politics, 64,
1095-114,
Huber, Gregg and Nolan McCarty (2004), 'Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform'.
American Political Science Review, 98, 481-94.
Huber, John D. and Charles R. Shipan (2006), 'Politics Delegation and Bureaucracy', in Barry R. Weingast
and Donald A, Wittman (cds), The Oxford Handbook o/Political Economy, New York: Oxford Cniversity
Press, pp. 256- 72.
Huber, John D, and Charles R. Shipan (2002), Deliberate Discretion? The Institutional Foundations of
Bureaucratic Autonomy, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Huber. John D., Charles R. Shipan and Madeleine Pfahler (2001), 'Legislatures and Statutory Control of
Bureaucracy', American Journal of Political Science, 45, 33045.
Johnson, George Robert (l987), 'The Split Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and
MSHA Experience', Administrative Law Review, 39, 315---51.
Kagan, Elena (2001), 'Presidential Administration', Harvard Law Revim, 114,2245-385.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and David Martimort (1999), 'Separation of Regulators Against Collusive Behavior',
Rand Journal olEconomiC's, 30(2), 232--{)2.
Landau, Martin (1991), 'On Multiorganizational Systems in Public Administration', Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, I( I), 5-\8.
Landau, Martin (1969), 'Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap', Public
Administration Review, 29(4), 346-58.
Lerner, Allan W. (1986), 'There is More Than One Way to be Redundant', Administration and Society, 18(3).
334-59.
Levinson, Daryl (2005), 'Empire Building in Constitutional Law', Harvard Law Review, 118, 915~72.
Lewis. David (2004), 'The Adverse Consequences of the Politics of Agency Design for Presidential Managemcnt
in the Cnited States: The Relative Durability of Insulated Agencies'. British Journal ol Political Science, 34,
377-404.
Lewis, David E. (2003), Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press.
Lewis, David (2002), The Politics of Agency Termination: Confronting the Myth of Agency Immortality',
JoumalofPolitics, 64(1): 89-107.
Lowi, Theodore (1979), The End (~fUberalism, New York: W.W. Norton.
Macey, Jonathan R. (1992), 'Organizational Design and Political Control of Administrative Agencies', Journal
0/ Law, Economics and Organization, 8, 93-\10.
Magill, M. Elizabeth (2004). 'Agency Choice of Policymaking Form', University of Chicago Law Review, 71.
1383-447.
Manning, John F. (2004), 'Nonlegislative Rules', George Washington Lall' Review, 72, 893~945.
Mashaw, Jerry L. (1990), 'Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of
Legal Development', Journal ol Law, Economics and Organi:;ation, 6, 267-98.
McCarty, Nolan (2004), 'The Appointments Dilemma" American Journal ol Polirical Science, 48( 3),413-28.
McCarty, Nolan and Rose Razaghian (1999), 'Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch
Nominations 1885-1996', American Journal 0/ Political Science, 43, 1122-43.
McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G. Noll and Barry R.Weingast (1989), 'Structure and Process, Politics and
Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies', Virginia Law Review, 75,
431-82.
McCubbins, Matthew D., Roger G, Noll and Barry R.Weingast (1987), 'Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control', Journal olLaw and Economics, 3(2), 243-77.
McCubbins, Matthew D. and Thomas Schwartz (1984), 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols
versus Fire Alarms', American Journal olPolitical Science, 28,165--79,
McGuire, Thomas, Coiner, Michael and Spancake, Larry (1979), 'Budget-maximizing Agencies and Efficiency
in Government'. Puhlic Choice, 34, 333··58.
Merrill, Thomas W. and Kristin Hickman (2001), 'Chevron's Domain', Georgetown Law Journal, 89,
833-92\.
Miller, Gary J. (1992), 114anagerial Dilemmas: 111e Political Economy oj'Hierarchy, New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Miller, Gary and Terry Moe (1983), 'Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government' , American Political
Science Review, 77(2): 297-322.
Moe, Terry (1997), 'Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy', in Dennis C. Mueller, Perspertives em Public
Choice: A Handbook, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 455-80.
Moe, Terry (1989), 'The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure', in J.E. Chubb and P.E. Peterson (cds), Can the
Government Govern?, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 267-329.

Moe, Terry (1985), 'Cc
Political Science Revi,

Moe, Terry (1982), 'Re!
Science, 26,197-224.
Moe, Terry M. and Mi(
Comparison of Presid
150,171-95.
Muris, Timothy J. (19
Congressional Contr(
Murphy, Richard W. (
917-37.
Nathan, Richard P. (191
Niskanen, William (197
Nixon, David C. (2004
Organi:;ation, 20, 438
Nokken, Timothy P. an(
to Independent Agen'
Nolan and Rose Razagl
1885-1996', AmericGI

O'Connell, Anne Josepl
O'Connell, Anne josepl
in the Post-9!1i Worl
Ogul, Morris S. (1976),
Cniversity of PittsbUl
Perrow, Charles (1984),
Posner, Eric A. and A(
Law Review, 69, 1721
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (I
Macey', Journal ol'L,
Shepsle, Kenneth A. an
New York: W.W. Nc
Skowronek, Stephen (
Capacities, 1877-192

Spence, David B. (199

Journal ol Legal SruG

Spence, David (] 997), "

Journal ol Puhlic Adl

Stearns, M~xwell and 1
Stephenson, Matthew'
53-110.
Stephenson, Matthew
Law. Economics and

Stephenson, Matthew I
Strauss, Peter (1984). '

Columbia Law Revie

Sunstein, Cass R (200(
Sunstein, Cass R (199C
Ting, Michael (2003), ,
47(2),274-92,
Ting, Michael M. (20
Political Science, 46
Volden, Craig (2002a

American Journal 0)

Volden, Craig (2002t

Economics and Org(

Weaver, Russell L. (I
Review, 43,35-73.
Weko, Thomas J. (19'
Weillgast, Barry R.
Regulatory Policy:
765-800.

Designing agencies

71.
of

the

361

Moe, Terry (1985), 'Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB" American
Polirical Science Review, 79, 1094-116.
Moe, Terry (1982), 'Regulatory Perfonnance and Presidential Administration', American Journal of Political
Science,26,197-224.
Moe, Terry M. and Michael Caldwell (1994), 'The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A
Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems'. Journal ofInstitutional and Theoretical Economics.
150.171-95.
Muris, Timothy J. (1986). 'Regulatory Policymaking at the Federal Trade Commission: The Extent of
Congressional Control', Journal of PoIWcal Economy. 94(4), 884-9.
Murphy, Richard W. (2006), 'Hunters for Administrative Common Law', Administrative Law Review, 58,
917-37.
Nathan. Richard P. (1983), The Administrative Presidency, New York: John Wiley.
Niskanen. William (1971). Bureaucracy and Representative Government, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton.
Nixon, David C. (2004), 'Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology'. Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization. 20,438-57.
Nokken, Timothy P. and Brian R. Sala (2000), 'Continnation Dynamics: A Model ofPresidential Appointments
to Independent Agencies', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12,91--112.
Nolan and Rose Razaghian (I 999}, 'Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations
1885-1996', American Journal of Political Science, 43,1122-43.
O'Connell, Anne Joseph (2009), 'Qualifications' (working paper).
O'Connell, Anne Joseph (2006), 'The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies
in the Post-91l1 World', California Law Review 94. 1655-744.
Ogul, Morris S. (1976), Congr~ss Oversees the Bureaucracy: Studies in Legislative Supervision, Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
Perrow, Charles (1984), Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies, New York: Basic Books.
Posner, Eric A. and Adrian Venneule (2002), 'Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine', University of Chicago
Law Review, 69,1721-62.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (I 992}, 'Bureaucratic Drift, Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment on
Macey', Journal of Law, Economics and Organi;:,ation, 8, 111--18.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek (I 997}, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions,
New York: W.W. Norton.
Skowronek, Stephen (1982), Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative
Capacities, 1877-1920, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Spence, David B. (1999), 'Managing Delegation Ex Ante: Using Law to Steer Administrative Agencies',
Journal of Legal Studies, 38, 413-59.
Spence, David (1997), 'Agency Policy Making and Political Control: Modeling Away the Delegation Problem',
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 7,199--219.
Stearns, Maxwell and Todd Zywicki (2009), Public Choice: Concepts and Applications in Law.
Stephenson, Matthew C. (2008), 'Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy', Michigan Law Review, 107,
53-110_
Stephenson, Matthew (2007), 'Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise', Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, 23(2), 469-98.
Stephenson, Matthew (2006), 'The Strategic Substitution Effect', Harvard Law Review, 120,528-72.
Strauss, Peter (1984), 'The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch',
Columbia Law Review, 84, 573--669.
Sunstein, Cass R (2006), 'Chevron Step Zero', Virginia Law Review, 92(2), 187-249.
Sunstein, Cass R (1990), 'Law and Administration After Chevron', Columbia Law Review, 90, 2071-120.
Ting, Michael (2003), 'A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy', American Journal of Political Science,
47(2),274-92.
Ting, Michael M. (2002), 'A Theory of Jurisdictional Assignments in Bureaucracies', American Journal of
Political Science, 46,364-78.
Volden, Craig (2002a), 'A Formal Model of the Polities of Delegation in a Separation of Powers System',
American Journal of Political Science, 46. 111-33.
Volden, Craig (2002b), 'Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States', Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 18, 187-220.
Weaver. Russell L (1991), 'Deference to Regulator Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts', Alabama Law
Review, 43, 35-73.
Weko, Thomas J. (1995), The PolitiCizing Presidency, Lawrence. KA: University of Kansas.
Weingast, Barry R. and Mark J. Moran (1983), 'Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission', Journal of Political Economy, 9l(5},
765-800.

362

Research handbook on public choice and public law

West. William F. (1995), Controlling Ihe Bureaucracy: Institutional Constraints in Theory and Praclice,
Annonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Whitford, Andrew B. (2003), 'Adapting Agencies: Competition, Imitation, and Punishment in the Design
of Bureaucratic Performance" in George A. Krause and Kenneth J. Meier (eds). Politics. Policy. and
Organizations: Frontiers in the Scientific Study of Bureaucracy. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan
Press, pp. 160-86.
Wilson, lames Q. (1989), Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do II, New York: Basic
Books.
Wintrobe, Ronald (1997), 'Modern Bureaucratic Theory', in Dennis C. Mueller, Perspectives on Public Choice:
A Handbook, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 42954.
Wood, B. Dan (1990), 'Does Politics Make a Difference at EEOC!', American Journal of Political Science. 34,
503-30.
Wood, B. Dan (1988), 'Principals, Bureaucrats, and Responsiveness in Clean Air Enforcements', American
Political Science Review, 82. 213-34.
Wood, B. Dan and lohn Bohte (2004), 'Political Transaction Costs and the Politics of Administrative Design',
Journal of Politics, 66, 176-202.
Wood, B. Dan and Richard W. Waterman (1994). The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy"
American Political Science Review. 85. 801-28.
Wood, B. Dan and Richard W. Waterman (1993). 'The Dynamics of Political-Bureaucratic Adaptation',
American Journal or Political Science, 37. 497-528.
Wood, B. Dan and Richard W. Waterman (1991), 'The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy'.
American Political Science Review. 85, 80128.

11 Mecha:
lonatha,

I. Introduction
Mechanism choi
rules for social b(
'an institution, p
In the realm 0
or policy design.
or failure as the j
the choice of to
mechanism desi!
matching optim
overcoming inc(
influence the act
areas, governanc
Public policy
executive agenci
preferences, ane
campaign contri
that the mechan
ones that best p
This chapter
the legal literat
design. It then 1
called public c'
explores how p
implement poli
ideal. We find
policy choices;
institutional set
II.

Normative

A. In general
Mechanism chc
ments to achie'
demonstrates (
a perfect desigl
offs among cor
In economic
tion. The sign

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Jacob E. Gersen
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
jgersen@uchicago.edu

Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
For a listing of papers 1–475 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html

476.
477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.

M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance” (July 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell and Julie Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes (July 2009)
Douglas G. Baird, The Holmesian Bad Man’s First Critic (August 2009)
Douglas G. Baird, The Bankruptcy Exchange (August 2009)
Jonathan Masur and Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis (August 2009)
Lee Anne Fennell, The Unbounded Home, Property Values beyond Property Lines (August 2009)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Henry Louis Gates and Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem? (September
2009)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman, and Eric A. Posner, Judging Women (September
2009)
Omri Ben-Shahar, One-Way Contracts: Consumer Protection without Law (October 2009)
Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for Negligence Per Se (October 2009)
Ariel Porat and Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm (October 2009)
Anup Malani and Ramanan Laxminrayan, Incentives for Surveillance of Infectious Disease
Outbreaks (October 2009)
Anup Malani, Oliver Bembom and Mark van der Laan, Accounting for Differences among
Patients in the FDA Approval Process (October 2009)
David Gilo and Ariel Porat, Viewing Unconsconability through a Market Lens (October 2009)
David Weisbach, Instrument Choice Is Instrument Design (October 2009)
M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones (November 2009)
Eric A. Posner, ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining
(November 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Innovation: Framing Baselines in the Google Book Search
Settlement (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Against Permititis: Why Volunteer Organizations Should Regulate the Use of
Cancer Drugs (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why There Is Too Little, Not Too
Much, Private Property (November 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, NRA v. City of Chicago: Does the Second Amendment Bind Frank
Easterbrook? (November 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Easterbrook on Copyright (November 2009)
Omri Ben-Shahar, Pre-Closing Liability (November 2009)
Randal C. Picker, Assessing Competition Issues in the Amended Google Book Search Settlement
(November 2009)
Saul Levmore, Ambigious Statutes (November 2009)
Saul Levmore, Interest Groups and the Problem with Incrementalism (November 2009)
Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration
(December 2009)
Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Reputation, Information and the Organization of the Judiciary
(December 2009)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Economic Foundations of the Law of the Sea (December 2009)
Jacob E. Gersen and Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in
the Administrative State (December 2009)
Richard A. Epstein, Impermissible Ratemaking in Health-Insurance Reform: Why the Reid Bill is
Unconstitutional (December 2009)
Tom Ginsburg and Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism (January 2010)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want? An
Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals (January 2010)
Joseph Isenbergh, The Future of Taxation (January 2010)
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (January 2010)

511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.

542.
543.

Tom Ginsburg, James Melton, and Zachary Elkiins, The Endurance of National Constitutions
(February 2010)
Omri Ben-Shahar and Anu Bradford, The Economics of Climate Enforcement (February 2010)
Neta-li E. Gottlieb, Free to Air? Legal Protection for TV Program Formats (February 2010)
Omri Ben-Shahar and Eric A. Posner, The Right to Withdraw in Contract Law (March 2010)
Richard A. Epstein, Inside the Coasean Firm: Competence as a Random Variable (March 2010)
Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (March 2010)
Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and Comparative
Perspectives (March 2010)
Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk (April 2010)
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Judicial Ability and Securities Class Actions
(April 2010)
Jonathan S. Masur and Jonathan Remy Nash, The Institutional Dynamics of Transition Relief
(April 2010)
M. Todd Henderson, Implicit Compensation, May 2010
Lee Anne Fennell, Possession Puzzles, June 2010
Randal C. Picker, Organizing Competition and Cooperation after American Needle, June 2010
Richard A. Epstein, What Is So Special about Intangible Property? The Case for intelligent
Carryovers, August 2010
Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, August 2010
Richard A. Epstein, Carbon Dioxide: Our Newest Pollutant, August 2010
Richard A. Epstein and F. Scott Kieff, Questioning the Frequency and Wisdom of Compulsory
Licensing for Pharmaceutical Patents, August 2010
Richard A. Epstein, One Bridge Too Far: Why the Employee Free Choice Act Has, and Should,
Fail, August 2010
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, August 2010
Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, August
2010
Ariel Porat and Avraham Tabbach, Risk of Death, August 2010
Randal C. Picker, The Razors-and-Blades Myth(s), September 2010
Lior J. Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, September 2010
Omri Ben Shahar, Damanged for Unlicensed Use, September 2010
Bermard E. Harcourt, Risk As a Proxy for Race, September 2010
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Voters, Non-Voters, and the Implications of Election
Timing for Public Policy, September 2010
Eric A. Posner, Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity, September 2010
Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, October 2010
Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Distributive Politics, October 2010
Eric A. Posner, The Constitution of the Roman Republic: A Political Economy Perspective,
November 2010
Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Pricing Terms in Sovereign Debt Contracts: A
Greek Case Study with Implications for the European Crisis Resolution Mechanism, Novemer
2010
Bernard E. Harcourt, Reducint Mass Incarceration: Lessons from the Deinstitutionalization of
Mental Hospitals in the 1960s, January 2011
Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, January 201l

